Within South Asian politics and society, events of the year 1971 with the bloody military crackdown on East Pakistan, the third India–Pakistan war, and subsequent emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country, still hold a living and outsized presence. Most popular historical accounts of the events argue that the separation of the two halves of Pakistan was not an inevitable outcome but a product of contingency, world historical developments, and choices made by political actors. In this paper, I argue from a perspective of Neoclassical Realist theory of international policy-making that not only the separation of the two halves of Pakistan was highly predisposed but also a violent parting was highly likely. I also argue that contingent and individual choice-based accounts of the events in 1971 help perpetuate misperception and friction in current politics of the subcontinent. Accepting the inevitability of the emergence of Bangladesh would go a long way in normalizing relations between the three large countries of South Asia.